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NOTES
LIBEL PER SE AND EPITHETS IMPUTING DISLOYALTY
Courts have long recognized that reputations can be injured by words
impugning patriotism or falsely ascribing beliefs in an ideology incompati-
ble with the American form of government.' Such an injury may be re-
dressed by a libel action brought to vindicate the plaintiff's name and to
recover damages. This note will examine the kinds of epithets that are
actionable on their face-libelous per se-with no requirement that the
plaintiff plead or prove special damages.
I. LIBEL PER SE AND LIBEL PER QUOD
The rules of libel accepted by the Restatement2 and stated by commenta-
tors appear simple.' A defamatory publication will subject one to liability
if it is false and the defendant was not privileged to make it.4 A defamation
consists of matter that tends to harm the reputation of a person so as to
diminish the community's respect for him and cause others not to associate
or deal with him.' Libel is the publication of defamatory matter by written
or printed words, pictures, signs, or other physical forms.6 Damage is pre-
1. 13 Mo. L. REv. 113, 115 (1948); 22 TUL. L. REv. 335, 336 (1947); see, e.g.,
Press Publishing Co. v. Gillette, 229 F. 108 (2d Cir. 1915); Farr v. Bramblett, 132
Cal. App. 2d 36, 281 P.2d 372 (1955); Stow v. Converse, 3 Conn. 325 (1820); Giles
v. State, 6 Ga. 276 (1848); Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co., 139 Ill. 345, 28
N.E. 692 (1891); Briggs v. Harrison, 152 La. 724, 94 So. 369 (1922); Seested v. Post
Printing & Publishing Co., 31 S.W.2d 1045 (Mo. 1930); Burrell v. Moran, 38 Ohio
Op. 2d 185, 82 N.E.2d 334 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1948); O'Donnell v. Philadelphia
Record Co., 356 Pa. 307, 51 A.2d 775, cert. denied, 332 U.S. 766 (1947).
2. R STATEMENT OF TORTS (1938).
3. See Samore, New York Libel Per Quod: Enigma Still?, 31 ALBANY L. REv. 250
(1967).
4. Id. For a general discussion of privilege see W. PROSSEP., TORTS §§ 109, 110
(3d ed. 1964). The privilege of fair comment will be treated at notes 87-93 inlra and
accompanying text. There is no defamation when the jury reasonably finds the pub-
lished matter to be true. Lovejoy v. Mutual Broadcasting Co., 220 S.W.2d 308 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1948).
5. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 106; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 559 (1938).
6. RnSTATEMENT OF TORTS § 568(1) (1938).
A number of states have statutes defining libel. "A libel is a false and malicious
defamation of another, expressed in print, or writing, or pictures, or signs, tending to
injure the reputation of an individual, and exposing him to public hatred, contempt, or
ridicule." GA. CoDE ANN. § 105-701 (1956); accord, CALIF. CIV. CODE § 45 (West
1954); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4801 (1948).
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sumed;7 the plaintiff is not required to plead or prove specific pecuniary
loss (special damages).8
Slander is the publication of defamatory matter by oral or other transi-
tory means, e.g., in sign language or by the nod of the head.9 Damage from
slander is not presumed, but must be proven, except in four special cate-
gories: those imputing major crimes; those imputing loathsome diseases;
those effecting the plaintiff in his business, trade, profession or office; and
those imputing unchastity to a woman."
The distinction between libel and slander is blurred by the American rule
of libel per quod. When facts extrinsic to a publication are needed to
make it defamatory, the publication is libelous per quod. When a libel is
per quod, the plaintiff must plead special damages as in slander." The
origin of the libel per quod rule is beyond the scope of this note, 2 and it is
not here intended to argue its merits. 3 However, it should be noted that
special damages can be difficult to establish. Thus, to require the plaintiff
7. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. Rav. 839, 842-43 (1960).
8. "One who falsely, and without privilege to do so, publishes matter defamatory
to another in such a manner as to make the publication a libel is liable to the other
although no special harm or loss of reputation results therefrom." RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 560 (1938); see Samore, supra note 3. The possibility of wide distribution is
the distinguishing feature of a publication that will support a libel action. RESTATEMENT
OF TORTS § 568, comment d (1938). Dean Prosser has challenged the validity of this
and other reasons for making libel actionable without special damages. Prosser, supra
note 7, at 842-43. It is not libelous per se to publish defamatory matter about a relative
or associate of a plaintiff. Skrochi v. Stahl, 14 Cal. App. 1, 110 P. 957 (1910); Powers
v. Bressler, 210 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Pogany v. Chambers, 206 Misc. 933,
134 N.Y.S.2d 691 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 285 App. Div. 866, 137 N.Y.S.2d 228 (1954).
9. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 568(2), comment d (1938).
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 570, 574 (1938); Prosser, supra note 7, at 441; Note
Libel Per Se and Special Damages, 13 VAND. L. REv. 730, 731 n.9 (1960).
11. Prosser, supra note 7, at 840. It is generally accepted that libels that would be
actionable per se as slanders would be libelous per se. Id. at 844 n.20; see Levy v.
Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S.2d 148 (Sup. Ct. 1941) (injury to profession). Dean
Prosser has suggested that the Restatement be changed to limit general damages in libel
to those defamatory on their face and the special slander categories. RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 569 (Tent. Draft No. 12, 1966). This position was rejected by
the American Law Institute. 43 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 460-62 (1966). A compromise
submitted to the Institute made the publisher liable for general damages if "he knew
or should have known of the extrinsic facts which were necessary to make the statement
defamatory...." 43 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 448 (1966). This proposition is still under
study. 1967 A.L.I. ANNUAL REPORT 11.
12. See Henn, Libel-by-Extrinsic-Fact, 47 CORN. L.Q. 14, 16-18 (1961); Prosser,
supra note 7; Note, supra note 10.
13. Arguments in favor of the rule are found in Prosser, supra note 7; Prosser, More
Libel Per Quod, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1629 (1966); 43 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 443 (1966).
Arguments against the rule are found in Eldredge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per
Quod, 79 HARV. L. REv. 733 (1966); 43 A.L.I. PROCEEDINGS 444 (1966).
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to prove special damages may preclude an injured party not only from
monetary compensation, but also from vindicating his reputation, which
may be the real purpose of the litigation. 4 Since these problems are avoided
when plaintiff can allege libel per se, it is useful to know what epithets
courts have included in that category.
II. DrRECT IMPUTATIONS
The basic politically defamatory assertion is that a person has beliefs or
belongs to a group antagonistic to the American form of government. Such
assertions may cause many to believe that the person so labeled participates
in unlawful activity, advocates the violent overthrow of the American po-
litical and economic system, or sympathizes with an enemy of the United
States.:
A. The Time of the Publication
Because the public attitude toward a political belief or group may change,
words harmless at one time may damage a reputation at another time."
The importance of the time factor can best be illustrated by examining cer-
tain epithets which have been held libelous per se, based upon the time of
the publication.17
In the 1890's, falsely stating that one was an anarchist was libelous per
se. One court so holding noted that the dictionary defined anarchist as "one
14. Eldredge, supra note 13, at 755-56.
15. 11 OHIo ST. L.J. 577 (1950).
16. Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (N.Y.
law applied); Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wash. 1943) (Wash.
law applied), appeal dismissed, 144 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1944); Switzer v. Anthony, 71
Colo. 291, 206 P. 391 (1922); Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947);
Lunn v. Littauer, 187 App. Div. 808, 175 N.Y.S. 657 (1919); Luotto v. Field, 49
N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct.), modified, 268 App. Div. 277, 50 N.Y.S.2d 849, rev'd on
other grounds, 294 N.Y. 460, 63 N.E.2d 58 (1944); Burrell v. Moran, 38 Ohio Op.
185, 82 N.E.2d 334 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1948); 26 IowA L. REv. 893 (1941);
45 Mici. L. REv. 518 (1947).
17. At least one court has confused the time of the publication with the time of the
acts alleged in the publication. In Luotto v. Field, 49 N.Y.S.2d 785 (Sup. Ct.),
modified, 268 App. Div. 277, 50 N.Y.S.2d 849, rev'd on other grounds, 294 N.Y. 460,
63 N.E.2d 58 (1944), the defendant published in 1942, during World War II, that the
plaintiff was a one-time Fascist in the years prior to Pearl Harbor and the American
entry into the War. The court stated that, prior to the War, Fascist was descriptive
of a form of government and did not acquire an evil meaning until the United States
was fighting Fascist forces. Therefore, the court reasoned, while it was libelous per se
falsely to charge that one was a Fascist during the War, it was not libelous per se if
the charge was that one was a Fascist before the War. The reasoning of the court over-
looks the strong possibility that the statement may have the same adverse effect on
the plaintiff's reputation whether the publication says he is a Fascist before or a Fascist
during the War. If a plaintiff's reputation is damaged he should be allowed to recover
no matter when the offensive association is alleged to have existed.
Washington University Open Scholarship
LIBEL PER SE AND EPITHETS IMPUTING DISLOYALTY
who incites revolt, or promotes disorder in the state," and found that
anarchists were commonly understood to advocate the destruction of gov-
ernment. It concluded that citizens must regard with hatred or contempt
those who advocate the destruction of government."5 Similar results were
reached in other pre-World War I cases involving charges that the plaintiff
was a "dangerous, able, and seditious agitator,"' 9 and that plaintiff had
called the United States flag a "dirty rag."2
Before World War I, a false imputation of being a German would not
have been libelous on its face because the epithet did not imply disloyalty.2
Such statements were considered libelous per se with the advent of the War
because they essentially labeled the plaintiff an enemy. 2 A similar analysis
appears in World War II cases involving alleged libels concerning Hitler
and the Nazis in Germany,' 3 the Fascists in Italy, and the Japanese." Being
called an enemy or one who favors an enemy during a war impugns one's
loyalty to the community in which he lives. Since disloyalty offends the
community, it is presumed that the plaintiff's reputation is seriously injured,
producing a cause of action based on the face of the publication, without
any need to plead extrinsic facts about the war."
Communism has been viewed as a threat to the United States for a longer
period of time than any of the other enemies or political groups previously
discussed. The holdings on epithets imputing Communist beliefs, activities
or affiliations have not been entirely consistent because the Soviet Union
was an ally of the United States during the Second World War. Prior to
World War II courts held that "Communist" or "red" was capable of
meaning one who believes in violence, sabotage, and the seizure of private
18. Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News, 139 Ill. 345, 353-54, 28 N.E. 692, 692-93
(1891).
19. Wilkes v. Shields, 62 Minn. 426, 64 N.W. 921 (1895).
20. Switzer v. Anthony, 71 Colo. 291, 206 P. 391 (1922); see Ogren v. Rockford
Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919), in which plaintiff, a candidate
for mayor on the Socialist ticket, was stated to advocate Socialism of a violent kind.
The court held this to be libelous per se. Although at this time the Socialist Party
offered to be the true Marxist party, the court in the case did not indicate whether a
false accusation of Socialist standing alone would be sufficient to constitute libel per se.
2 BAYLOR L. Rav. 358 (1950).
21. Briggs v. Harrison, 152 La. 724, 94 So. 369 (1922).
22. Id.; Seested v. Post Printing & Publishing Co., 326 Mo. 559, 31 S.W.2d 1045
(1930).
23. O'Donnell v. Philadelphia Record Co., 356 Pa. 307, 51 A.2d 775, cert. denied,
332 U S. 766 (1947); Goodrich v. Reporter Publishing Co., 199 S.W.2d 228 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1946).
24. Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wash. 1943), appeal dis-
missed, 144 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1944).
25. O'Donnell v. Philadelphia Record Co., 356 Pa. 307, 51 A.2d 775, cert. denied,
332 U.S. 766 (1947).
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property.2" In recognizing that the Communist movement opposed the
American system, the courts equated the label "Communist" with disloyalty
to the United States.27
Since the Soviet Union and the United States were allies during the Sec-
ond World War, it might be expected that the public disdain for Com-
munism would have lessened so that the imputation would not be defama-
tory. This was the position taken by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in
McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co.2" In 1946 defendant
falsely attributed to the plaintiff the statement, "We all have to have a little
Communism today." Though the court could reasonably have held this
statement incapable of meaning that the plaintiff advocated Communism,"
it decided that to say a man was a Communist was not to defame him."
The court reasoned that Russia and the United States had become friendly
during the war, and the public no longer identified Communism with Rus-
sian terrorism. However, during World War II other courts held such
imputations libelous per se," ' arguing that there was a general belief that
Communism condones violence against the established government, and
that it is the public belief that is the test for determining the epithet's de-
famatory character.32 The time factor therefore did not affect "Communist"
26. Toomey v. Jones, 124 Okla. 167, 254 P. 736 (1926); see Wells v. Times Printing
Co., 77 Wash. 329, 137 P. 457 (1913) which held that a publication charging plaintiff
in 1912 with being a "red-tinted agitator" was libelous per se. The alleged libel also
consisted of charges that plaintiff "reviled the U.S. Flag" and "denounced Old Glory
as a dirty rag." The court did not discuss "red-tinted agitator" apart from the other
statements.
27. In Garriga v. Richfield, 174 Misc. 315, 20 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1940), the
court found that the false statement "Communist" was not libelous per se in 1939. This
view was rejected one year later in Levy v. Gelber, 175 Misc. 746, 25 N.Y.S.2d 148
(Sup. Ct. 1941) (plaintiff called a "Nazi" and a "Communist") and Gallagher v.
Chavalas, 48 Cal. App. 2d 52, 119 P.2d 408 (1941). A possible reason for this rejection
was that the Soviet Union had become more aggressive in Europe since the decision
in Garriga. 45 MiCH. L. Rzv. 518, 519 (1947); see 26 IowA L. Rlv. 893 (1941); 32
MINN. L. REv. 412, 413 n.8 (1948).
In Hays v. American Defense Soc'y, 252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929), the court
indicated that a false accusation of Communism would be libelous, although the plain-
tiff was not actually labeled a Communist in the case. In Washington Times Co. v.
Murray, 299 F. 903 (D.C. Cir. 1924), it was held that to be falsely accused of being a
secret agent of Russia in 1922 was libelous. Cf. Branch v. Cahill, 88 F.2d 545 (9th Cir.
1937).
28. 364 Pa. 504, 72 A.2d 780 (1950).
29. Cf. 98 U. PA. L. Rav. 931 (1950).
30. McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72 A.2d 784
(1950).
31. See id. at 519, 72 A.2d at 787 (dissenting opinion).
32. See, e.g., Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619, 622 (7th Cir. 1947); Burrell v. Moran,
38 Ohio Op. 185, 82 N.E.2d 334 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1948); 98 U. PA. L. REv.
931 (1950).
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to the degree it did other epithets, e.g., "German." The public view of
Communism remained largely adverse,3 and this view has prevailed to the
present."
B. Public Opinion
The major test for per se political libel is contemporary community opin-
ion. Courts rely upon a number of factors to determine what epithets will
alienate community opinion. When the epithet is connected with a foreign
government, the relations between the United States and that foreign gov-
ernment will be an important factor. Courts have also sought a reflection
of public attitude in legislative acts and executive orders. 5 Examples of
relevant governmental actions include laws excluding aliens who advocate
the violent overthrow of the government36 and laws denying governmental
employment to such persons." Courts have taken such enactments as evi-
dence of the public aversion toward such persons, and have found that
Communists in particular subscribe to the disapproved beliefs. 8 The gov-
ernment's failure to declare a particular group illegal has led some courts
to hold that there is no public hatred for that group. In Garriga v. Rick-
33, For examples of cases contemporary to McAndrew which viewed the epithet
"Communist" differently, see Spanel v. Pegler, 166 F.2d 298 (2d Cir. 1948); Spanel v.
Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947); Wright v. Farm Journal, 158 F.2d 976 (2d Cir.
1947); Spanel v. Pegler, 70 F. Supp. 926 (D. Conn. 1946); Mencher v. Chesley, 297
N.Y. 94, 75 N.E,2d 257 (1947); Burrell v. Moran, 38 Ohio Op. 185, 82 N.E.2d 334
(C.P. Cuyahoga County 1948); Americans for Democratic Action v. Meade, 72 Pa. D.
& C. 306 (C.P. Philadelphia County 1950); 2 BAYLOR L. RIv. 358 (1950); 45 MicH.
L. REv. 518 (1947).
34. See, e.g., Utah State Farm Bureau Fed'n v. National Farmers Union Serv. Corp,,
198 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1952); Foltz v. News Syndicate Co., 114 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y.
1953), continued by executor, Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co., 130 F. Supp. 17
(S.D.N.Y. 1955); Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y.
1953); Macleod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959); Farrv.
Bramblett, 132 Cal. App. 2d 36, 281 P.2d 372 (1955); Weisberger v. Condon, 6 Misc.
2d 176, 161 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. 1957). See also Pauling v, News Syndicate Co.,
335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 968 (1965); Steinman v. DiRoberts,
23 App. Div. 693, 257 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 514, 214 N.E.2d 89, 267
N.Y.S.2d 512 (1966); Pauling v. National Review Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d
11 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Clark v. Allen, 415 Pa. 484, 204 A.2d 42 (1964); W. PROSSER,
supra note 4, § 106, at 761.
35. See Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 100-01, 75 N.E.2d 257, 259-60 (1947);
Burrell v, Moran, 38 Ohio Op. 185, 82 N.E.2d 344 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1948).
36. See Gallagher v. Chavallas, 48 Cal. App. 2d 52, 58, 119 P.2d 408, 412 (1941);
cf. Branch v. Cahill, 88 F.2d 545 (9th Cir. 1937).
37. See Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 101, 75 N.E.2d 257, 260 (1947); Note,
Recent Legislative Attempts to Curb Subversive Activities in the United States, 10 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 104 (1941); 32 MINN. L. REv. 412 (1948).
38, See cases cited notes 33 & 34 supra.
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field, " for example, the court held that, even if the Communist Party did
believe in the overthrow of the government by force, the Party was not
illegal; therefore, a false accusation of Communism could not be libelous
per se. However, to hold the legality of the Party an absolute bar to plain-
tiff's claim overlooks the fact that adverse public opinion may exist without
finding expression in legislative or executive action. It is improper to infer
public opinion from a legislature's failure to act.
Some courts turn to the dictionary definition of a term in order to ascer-
tain what the public believes the term to mean." This may produce unsatis-
factory results, for the dictionary is not a reliable guide to public opinion.41
For example, one court found the definition of "Communism" to be a sys-
tem of common ownership of production and equal distribution, with no
mention of violence. 2 While this definition makes no mention of violence,
the association of Communism with violence, regardless of a dictionary defi-
nition, may be crucial in creating adverse public opinion.
It is difficult for a court to discover public opinion by using such indica-
tors as the dictionary or the legislature, and it is undesirable to base a deci-
sion on any one of such bits of evidence standing alone. There are no con-
clusive determinants, and all that the courts can hope for is a rough
approximation-a feeling-of the public mood as determined by a variety
of sources. These sources can include public opinion polls, party platforms,43
or psychological studies on human reaction to particular terms." It is prob-
ably dangerous for judges to rely on their own feelings as evidence of public
opinion, for any judge is but a sample of one. Inadequate as available
tools are for assessing public opinion, they will at least lay a groundwork for
the courts.
39. 174 Misc. 315, 20 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1940). The legality of the Communist
Party was also noted in McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504,
72 A.2d 780 (1950).
40. Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News, 139 Ill. 345, 28 N.E. 692 (1891); McAndrew
v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72 A.2d 780 (1950).
41. 98 U. PA. L. REv. 931, 932 (1950); see Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185
(1909); Americans for Democratic Action v. Meade, 72 Pa. D. & C. 306 (C.P. Phila.
delphia County 1950); W. PROSSER, supra note 4, § 106, at 761. The recipient does
not have to correctly understand the publication. "The meaning of a communication
is that which the recipient correctly, or mistakenly but reasonably, understands that it
was intended to express." RESTATEmENT OF TORTS § 563 (1938).
42. McAndrew v. Scranton Republican Publishing Co., 364 Pa. 504, 72 A.2d 780
(1950).
43. Id. at 514, 72 A.2d at 784.
44. Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 100, 75 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1947); 32 MJNN.
L. REv. 412, 413 (1948); see Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and
Fair Comment II, 42 COLUII. L. REv. 1282, 1304-05 (1942).
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III. INDIRECT IMPUTATIONS
The previous section dealt with direct statements that a plaintiff was dis-
loyal or a member of a disloyal group. Many courts have held libelous per
se false imputations of actions, beliefs, or associations from which the com-
munity could infer disloyalty. When the imputation is indirect, the courts
have the added burden of determining whether the inference alleged is one
which the community could reasonably have made.
A. Standard of Reasonable Inferences
When a statement is claimed to be libelous per se, the court must deter-
mine whether that statement is capable of a defamatory meaning. The
usual test is whether the epithet is reasonably susceptible to the meaning
alleged by the plaintiff. If that test is met, the statement is sent to the jury
to determine if those to whom it was published read into it the defamatory
meaning."
A court will not ordinarily place one meaning on the words to the exclu-
sion of all other possible meanings."7 The Superior Court of New Jersey, in
Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Company,4" has deviated from this
general rule by holding that the judge has discretion to make a conclusive
determination on whether the meaning is defamatory. The defendant had
falsely published that plaintiff, a labor leader, opposed a resolution that
commended the policy of a mayor in dismissing teachers and other city
employees who pleaded the Fifth Amendment in a Communist investiga-
tion. The court found that as a matter of law the community would believe
this false publication was tantamount to portraying plaintiff as a Commu-
nist or Communist sympathizer. The court held the statement defamatory
and refused to send the issue to the jury, reasoning that, if a court knows
that a substantial number of people will hold the plaintiff in low esteem,
there is no need for a jury determination that might reverse the court's
decision.49 The court did not reveal the source of its knowledge of the pub-
lic reaction to the publication.
45. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 614 (1938); ef. Bates v. Campbell, 213 Cal. 438,
442, 2 P.2d 383, 385 (1931).
46. Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947); Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 797 (1946); Chaplin v. National
Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing
Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959); Mosler v. Whelan, 28 N.J. 397, 147 A.2d 7
(1958); Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947).
47. Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 99, 75 N.E.2d 257, 259 (1947); W. PROSSER,
supra note 4, § 106, at 765.
48. 48 N.J. Super. 420, 138 A.2d 61 (1958).
49. Id. at 440-41, 138 A.2d at 72. This decision was sustained on rehearing. Herr-
mann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 49 N.J. Super. 551, 140 A.2d 529 (1958).
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In cases of indirect imputation, there is greater opportunity for reasonable
disagreement because the epithet is ambiguous. Since the epithet's mean-
ing may be questioned, it would seem wiser for a court to send the issue to
the jury. In the Herrmann case,"0 an alternative meaning could be that
plaintiff favored the right against self incrimination provided in the Fifth
Amendment, an interpretation that should not injure the plaintiff's reputa-
tion in the community. The members of the jury actually act as the ordi-
nary readers, and it is the effect on them that determines whether there is
a defamation. With a jury determination a court has at least a larger
sampling on which to determine what ordinary readers of the publication
would think about the plaintiff.
The innocent construction rule is another deviation from the general
rule that words go to the jury if they are reasonably susceptible to a defama-
tory meaning. The innocent construction rule, followed only in Illinois,"1
requires the court to read the article as a whole, and give the words their
natural and obvious meaning. If the epithet can be read innocently, it is
non-actionable as a matter of law.52 The rule has been criticized because it
ignores the actual effect of a publication on the average reader, and sub-
stitutes the court's ability to find a possible innocent meaning. 3 Since some
publications which might convey a defamatory meaning may also have an
innocent meaning, it is likely that a plaintiff, in fact defamed, will be de-
nied recovery.54
B. The Degree of Association and the Strength of the Inference
When an imputation is indirect, there is less certainty that the reader
knows what the publication means. Faced with such a publication, a court
must determine whether the degree of association is sufficient that a reader
could reasonably infer disloyalty.
The intense patriotism that exists during a war can cause defamatory
inferences to be drawn from words that would not support such inferences
50. Herrmann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 48 N.J. Super 420, 138 A.2d 61
(1958), discussed in notes 48 & 49 supra and accompanying text.
51. Note, The Illinois Doctrine of Innocent Construction: A Minority of One, 30
U. CH. L. REv. 524 (1963); see Porcella v. Time, Inc., 300 F.2d 162 (7th Cir. 1962);
John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 181 N.E.2d 105, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 877 (1962).
52. John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 443, 181 N.E.2d 105, 108, cert denied, 371
U.S. 877 (1962).
53. MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 547, 343 P.2d 36, 44
(1959).
54. An excellent example of this undesirable result is found in Dilling v. Illinois Pub-
lishing & Printing C6., 340 Ill. App. 303, 91 N.E.2d 635 (1950); see Parmelee v. Hearst
Publishing Co., 341 II. App. 339, 93 N.B.2d 512 (1950).
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in peacetime. It was libelous during World War I to call one a "profiteer"
or "tool" of profiteers because of the natural inference that the libelee was
damaging the war effort for private benefit.55 During World War II, a
person's reputation would be injured if the public believed that he main-
tained ties with "pro-Nazis,"" or was a "pal of the Japanese," or was
friendly with a follower of fascism.5
Cases in which the plaintiff alleges he has been labeled a Communist
are particularly illustrative of these problems because such imputations are
often indirect. Defendant frequently sets up a relation between the plain-
tiff and Communism or Communist activities that does not necessarily
imply disloyalty, as for example, that the plaintiff is the legislative repre-
sentative of the Communist Party." In the latter instance it was held
that the difference between calling one a Communist and calling him an
agent, sympathizer, or "fellow traveler" was one only of degree. Any im-
putation connecting plaintiff with Communism indicates a threat to Amer-
ican institutions. The fact that it was indirect may make the plaintiff's
case stronger because many people are more fearful of those who operate
in secret." These observations have been generally accepted by courts;
most false allegations of relationships to Communism or Communist activi-
ties have been found libelous on their face."0 An example is found in
55. Lunn v. Littauer, 187 App. Div. 808, 175 N.Y.S. 657 (1919).
56. Hryhorijiv v. Winchell, 180 Misc. 575, 45 N.Y.S.2d 31 (Sup. Ct. 1943), aff'd,
267 App. Div. 817, 47 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1944); see Christopher v. American News Co.,
171 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1948).
57. Holden v. American News Co., 52 F. Supp. 24 (E.D. Wash. 1943), appeal dis-
missed, 144 F.2d 249 (9th Cir. 1944); Hartmann v. Winchell, 187 Misc. 54, 63
N.Y.S.2d 225 (Sup. Ct. 1946). Even in peacetime a charge of treason is likely to be
held libelous on its face, not on the basis of imputing a crime, but on that of general
injury to reputation. See Press Club v. Gillette, 229 F. 108 (2d Cir. 1915). But cf.
Kellems v. California CIO Council, 68 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Cal. 1946).
58. Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326
US. 797 (1946).
59. Id. at 735.
60. Utah State Farm Bureau Fed'n v. National Farmers Union Serv. Corp., 198 F.2d
20 (10th Cir. 1952) (Communist dominated organization); Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d
619 (7th Cir. 1947); MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 546, 343
P.2d 36, 42 (1959); Farr v. Bramblett, 132 Cal. App. 2d 36, 281 P.2d 372 (1955)
(part of Communist front organization); Jeffers v. Screen Extras Guild, 107 Cal. App.
2d 253, 237 P.2d 51 (1951) (part of Communist influenced Conference of Unions);
Mencher v. Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947) (former Daily Worker em-
ployee and campaign manager for a Communist political candidate) ; Lasky v. Kempton,
134 N Y.S.2d 730 (Sup. Ct. 1954), rev'd on other grounds, 285 App. Div. 1121, 140
N.Y.S,2d 526 (1955); Yankuich, Certainty in the Law of Defamation, 1 U.C.L.A.L.
RE%,. 163, 168 (1954); see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 139 (1951); Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 3 Misc. 2d 833, 155 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Sup. Ct.
1956), aff'd, 3 App. Div. 2d 703, 160 N.Y.S.2d 621 (1957).
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Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co.," in which the plaintiff was falsely
accused of giving statements to a French Communist newspaper. In hold-
ing the publication libelous per se, the court stated:
In times of extreme fear and suspicion, inflammatory inferences may
be drawn from words which in calmer times sound completely inno-
cent. It is impossible to ignore the repugnance and loathing which
association with Communist organizations arouses today in the public
mind and the widespread suspicion of those who evade disclosure or
refuse to answer questions about such alleged connections. I cannot
say, therefore, that as a matter of law reasonable men could not find
that this publication in and of itself was sufficient to bring plaintiff
into disrepute and subject him to hatred or contempt.02
If the activity or group is well known and association with it indicates dis-
loyalty, courts have no trouble finding a publication libelous per se. How-
ever, it becomes difficult for a court to so hold when it is probable that the
public is ignorant of the meaning of the terms used. An example of this
problem is found in Balabanoff v. Hearst Publications," in which the de-
fendant published that plaintiff was a member of the "dread Cheka."
Plaintiff's complaint stated that this was commonly known as a Russian
terror organization. It was held that the plaintiff's allegations were only to
explain what was generally known, and did not constitute extrinsic facts
that would require the plaintiff to plead special damages.6" The reasoning
was that, though a word standing alone might at first appear harmless, its
meaning must be taken in context and includes all that is publicly known
about it 5 While there is little doubt that the community would dislike the
plaintiff if it knew what the Cheka was, there is doubt whether a substan-
tial number of the community knew the nature of the organization." (It
61. 15 F.R.D. 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
62. Id. at 137; see Foltz v. News Syndicate Co., 114 F. Supp. 599 (S.D.N.Y. 1953),
continued by executor, Palmisano v. News Syndicate Co., 130 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
63. 294 N.Y. 351, 62 N.E.2d 599 (1945).
64. Id. at 355, 62 N.E.2d at 601.
65. Id.; RESTATEMENT OF ToRTS § 563, comment d (1938); Samore, New York
Libel Per Quod: Enigma Still?, 31 ALBANY L. Rav. 250, 252 (1967); see De Figuerola
v. McGraw-Hill Publishing Co., 189 Misc. 840, 74 N.Y.S.2d 448 (Sup. Ct. 1947),
aff'd, 273 App. Div. 875, 78 N.Y.S.2d 197 (1948), in which defendant published an
article describing a man with the same name as plaintiff as the director of a five-year
plan for Peron of Argentina. Plaintiff's picture appeared in the article. The court held
that plaintiff's allegation that the Argentine Figuerola was found to be a war-time Axis
agent by the United States government was sufficient to make the article libelous per se,
based on the rule in the Balabanoff case.
66. Some courts have stated that the evil opinion should be in the minds of "right
thinking persons." Spanel v. Pegler, 160 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1947); Kimmerle v. New
York Evening Journal, 262 N.Y. 99, 186 N.E. 217 (1933). However, the better
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could be argued, however, that "dread" anything would be libelous, regard-
less of connotations of disloyalty.) Such knowledge was probably limited to
a select, educated group.67 Therefore, the Balabanoff court should not have
allowed the plaintiff to recover on the basis of an epithet that was not
known to a substantial number of the community.
Even if the term is familiar, such as "Communist tendencies," it can be
argued that there is public confusion as to whether such term implies dis-
loyalty. The certainty of a decade ago may no longer exist, and people
may disagree as to what actions exhibit "Communist tendencies" or what is
meant by "pro-Communist.""8 Since there is confusion and disagreement,
the wisest course may be to permit free discussion of the problem of Com-
munism without stifling the search for answers by the possibility of law-
suits.6" Most courts, however, do not accept this reasoning when epithets
clearly portray plaintiff as a Communist sympathizer, or a "fellow-trav-
eler.""7 This result, however, should not be extended to such terms as "un-
American,"'" "left-winger,"' or "liberal," 3 for they do not sufficiently
impute disloyal beliefs to the plaintiff. The views and activities of loyal
citizens frequently coincide with those of Communists or the Communist
Party, but this concurrence does not reasonably permit the inference that
these persons are Communists.7" An example is the current protest against
the war in Viet Nam by students and others. It cannot reasonably be said
that their motives for opposing the war are connected with the objectives
of the enemy, nor can their protest reasonably be construed as consciously
supporting the enemy against the best interests of the United States.75 It
and predominant view is that any substantial number of the community is sufficient.
Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185 (1909); Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d
733 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 797 (1946); Herrmann v. Newark Morning
Ledger Co., 49 N.J. Super. 551, 140 A.2d 529 (1958); W. PROSSER, TORTS § 106, at
760 (3d ed. 1964).
67. Samore, supra note 65, at 253.
68. Clark v. Allen, 415 Pa. 484, 495, 204 A.2d 42, 47 (1964).
69. See id.
70. See cases cited note 60 supra.
71. In Mosler v. Whelan, 28 N.J. 397, 405, 147 A.2d 7, 12 (1958), the jury found
statements that plaintiff was influenced by the thinking of a foreign philosophy alien to
the American way and practiced un-American activities not defamatory to the plaintiff.
72. Barton v. Barnett, 226 F. Supp. 375 (N.D. Miss. 1964); see Steinman v.
DiRoberts, 23 App. Div. 2d 693, 257 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1965), aff'd, 17 N.Y.2d 510, 214
N.E.2d 89, 267 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1966).
73. Id.
74. Steinman v. DiRoberts, 23 App. Div. 2d 693, 257 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1965), aff'd,
17 N.Y.2d 510, 214 N.E.2d 89, 267 N.Y.S.2d 512 (1966).
75. This problem had been recognized in earlier cases. In Santana v. Item Co. 192
La. 819, 189 So. 442 (1939), the court found that to say falsely that a person attacked
the pacifism of American youth was not libelous per se because this merely expressed a
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is difficult to infer that one is a Communist, or otherwise disloyal to the
United States, from a publication that one opposes the war; such imputa-
tions should not be held libelous per se. Patriotic activity may take many
forms, and dissent from existing governmental policy is one of those forms.
If this is accepted, it would not then be libelous per se to be charged with
associating with dissenting groups or participating in activities expressing
dissent.
C. Libel by Comparison
When the publication compares the plaintiffs activities with those of a
known enemy, as by saying that his actions were like the Gestapo's,' courts
have reached divergent results. The Gestapo comparison was held libelous
per se when the United States was at war with Germany. There was a
general public hatred of German institutions and a comparison to the
activities of that government could damage the plaintiff in the eyes of the
average reader. Other courts held that such a comparison alone did not
state that a plaintiff was disloyal."' The reason was that the alleged defama-
tion was only a characterization of what, in defendant's opinion, were
objectionable activities carried on by the plaintiff. Such a statement, there-
fore, did not constitute libel per se."'
Those cases which hold comparisons not libelous per se ignore the fact
that plaintiff's injuries are not necessarily dependent upon the imputation
of disloyalty. The person or thing to which plaintiff is compared may be
so hateful that the comparison will naturally cause the community to dis-
like the plaintiff. It can hardly be argued that to be denounced as "Hitler-
like" in 1945 would not cause adverse feelings in the community.7" "Ges-
tapo-like" or "acting in a manner more in keeping with Hitler"81 appear
to be equally damaging, yet these statements were held not libelous per se.
In comparison cases, a court should consider whether the comparison is
damaging without imputing disloyalty before it decides that there is no
libel per se.
view that many Americans held, thus, no disloyalty could be inferred from the publica-
tion. In Sack v. New York Times Co., 56 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. 1945), the court
held that the false statement that plaintiff defended Communism's implementation in
the Soviet Union as a reasonable operation was not libelous per se. This was not equiva-
lent to saying he advocated the system's implementation here.
76. Browder v. Cook, 59 F. Supp. 225 (D. Idaho 1944).
77. Schy v. Hearst Publishing Co., 205 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1953); Aiken v. Consti-
tution Publishing Co., 72 Ga. App. 250, 33 S.E.2d 555 (1945).
78. Schy v. Hearst Publishing Co., 205 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1953).
79. Tidmore v. Mills, 33 Ala. App. 243, 32 So. 2d 769 (1947).
80. Schy v. Hearst Publishing Co., 205 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1953).
81. Aiken v. Constitution Publishing Co., 72 Ga. App. 250, 33 S.E.2d 555 (1945).
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D. Libel by Listing
Inclusion of plaintiff's name on a list which is contained in a publica-
tion that attacks the loyalty of a group or organization can raise a possible
inference of disloyalty against those on the list. An example of such a
publication is found in Hays v. American Defense Society, 2 in which an
organization was attacked as being part of the "Interlocking Directorates
of the Communist Plan for world revolution." Plaintiff was named on a
list as being a member of this organization, but was nowhere else men-
tioned in the publication. The court found no libel, reasoning that the
organization was being attacked, and not the individual members.8 3 This
result is questionable because, although the plaintiff is not directly attacked,
the mention of his name in the publication can still create suspicion about
him."' The holding assumes that the public will always read the publica-
tion carefully and see that plaintiff is not being individually attacked. This
assumption may not be valid: many readers will remember only that the
plaintiff's name was connected with the disloyal organization or group in
some manner. As a result, a defendant could cast suspicion on the plain-
tiff and escape liability. On the other hand, an argument can be made
that the holding is reasonable. If the rule were different, a writer would
never be free from the threat of a lawsuit if he mentioned any names in
a discussion of disloyalty. Free discussion of the topic would be hindered.
The best approach is to find no libel per se when the author explains that
plaintiff does not adhere to the unpopular belief.8" This would properly
put the burden on the author to minimize the injury an innocent party
might suffer. 6
IV. THE NEW YORK TIMEs DOCTRINE AND FAiR COMMENT
The privilege of fair comment entitles one to publish criticism and
opinion about another on matters of legitimate public concern to the com-
82. 252 N.Y. 266, 169 N.E. 380 (1929).
83. Id; see Julian v. American Business Consultants, 2 N.Y.2d 1, 137 N.E.2d 1, 155
N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).
84. 32 NOTRE DAME LAw. 339 (1957). This is particularly true if the author goes
beyond mere listing and talks about the plaintiff specifically. See Derounian v. Stokes,
168 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1948).
85. Julian v. American Business Consultants, 2 N.Y.2d 1, 137 N.E.2d 1, 155 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1956).
86. Both the heightened potential for damage to reputation in current public
sensitivity to Communism and subversion and the deep and irreparable nature of
the harm when done require that those who take the risk of writing that about
others which in fact does such damage be held to do so at their peril if the utter-
ance be untrue and otherwise legally injustified.
Hermann v. Newark Morning Ledger Co., 49 N.J. Super. 551, 561, 140 A.2d 529, 534
(1958).
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munity as a whole."" The privilege usually extends to expressions of opinion
or criticism, but until recently has not gone to a false assertion of fact.8
The privilege is limited to publications not motivated by improper or
malicious purposes. If there is malice, the privilege is lost and the plaintiff
may recover general damages.8" In cases involving imputations of dis-
loyalty, the privilege protects those who comment on public officials,"0 or
persons taking a controversial position, 1 including non-officeholders who
make speeches92 and write articles."
The decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan9' extended the tradi-
tional fair comment privilege to those who make false statements of fact
about public officials.9 In order to recover, the plaintiff must prove that
the false statement of fact was made with actual malice, i.e., it was made
"with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it
was false or not."96 As a result of this decision, when the plaintiff is a public
official the libel per se issue will not be reached unless plaintiff can prove
actual malice on the part of the defendant.
The New York Times decision created confusion in the lower courts as
to what "public official" meant. 7 Several courts have extended the actual
malice requirement beyond public officeholders. For instance, plaintiff in
Pauling v. News Syndicate Co." was a scientist who spoke publicly against
87. W. PROSSER, supra note 66, § 110(5), at 812.
88. Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 762 (1943);
Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co., 288 Ill. 405, 123 N.E. 587 (1919); Mencher v.
Chesley, 297 N.Y. 94, 75 N.E.2d 257 (1947); Hall v. Binghampton Press Co., 263 App.
Div. 403, 33 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1942), aff'd, 296 N.Y. 714, 7 N.E.2d 537 (1946). A minor-
ity view is that the privilege will also cover a misstatement of fact, at least for public
officials and candidates for public office. W. PROSSER, supra note 66, § 110(5), at 814.
89. See Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 762
(1943); MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 343 P.2d 36 (1959); Hall
v. Binghampton Press Co., 263 App. Div. 403, 33 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1942), aft'd, 296 N.Y.
714, 70 N.E.2d 537 (1946); Schwimmer v. Commercial Newspaper Co., 131 Misc. 552,
228 N.Y.S. 220 (Sup. Ct. 1928); Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892
(1952).
90. Hall v. Binghampton Press Co., 263 App. Div. 403, 33 N.Y.S.2d 840 (1942),
aft'd, 296 N.Y. 714, 70 N.E.2d 537 (1946).
91. W. PROSSER, supra note 66, § 110, at 814.
92. Kellems v. California CIO Council, 68 F. Supp. 277 (N.D. Calif. 1946).
93. Potts v. Dies, 132 F.2d 734 (D.C. Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 762 (1943).
94. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
95. Clark v. Allen, 415 Pa. 484, 488-89, 204 A.2d 42, 44 (1964).
96. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964).
97. See Bertesman, Libel and Public Men, 52 A.B.A.J. 657 (1966). The Supreme
Court refused to name specific categories to which the decision should apply. Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 n.12 (1966); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S.
254, 283 n.23 (1964).
98. 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 968 (1965).
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the testing of nuclear weapons and had expressed displeasure at the resump-
tion of testing by Russia. In a newspaper editorial defendant commented
that it was nice to have Pauling "on the American side for once" and that
Krushchev was Pauling's "friend in the Kremlin."9 The Second Circuit held
that the statement was not libelous as a matter of law and that the issue
was properly sent to the jury, which found for defendant. In dictum, the
court stated that the New York Times doctrine could not be limited to
government officeholders, but should logically be extended to candidates
for public office and to those who participate in public debate on matters
of general concern.' Because he had voluntarily engaged in public dis-
cussion, Pauling became a public figure and had to meet the New York
Times standards.' 0'
Courts have already extended the New York Times doctrine0 2 to ap-
pointed as well as elected officials, and to candidates for public office.' 0 '
The Pauling court was correct in holding that the logic of the doctrine
compels its extension beyond the government employee, for in many in-
stances a public figure can affect community attitudes, especially in view
of the wide circulation of information to the public from non-government
people as well as government employees.' However, the Supreme Court,
in a divided decision, refused to extend the doctrine to include public
figures.10
5
99. Id. at 663.
100. Id. at 671.
101. This was the result reached in two later cases involving the same plaintiff.
Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 909 (1967); Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 269 N.Y.S.2d
11 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
102. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196-97 (8th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967). But see Powell v. Monitor Publishing Co,
107 N.H. 83, 217 A.2d 193, (1966); Faulk v. Aware, Inc., 14 N.Y.2d 954, 202 N.E.2d
372, 253 N.Y.S.2d 990 (1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 916 (1965); Spahn v. Julian
Meusner, Inc., 43 Misc. 2d 219, 250 N.Y.S.2d 529 (Sup. Ct. 1964), aff'd, 23 App. Div.
2d 216, 260 N.Y.S.2d 451 (1965).
103. Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196-97 (8th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 388 U.S. 909 (1967), and cases cited therein.
104. Bertelsman, supra note 97, at 659.
105. The occasion presented itself in the consolidated cases of Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Four Justices refused to
extend the New York Times standards to public figures, but rather decided the cases on
the basis of whether there were unreasonable departures from the standards of investiga-
tion and reporting ordinarily followed by responsible publishers. Id. at 158 (Justices
Harlan, Stewart, Fortas, and Clark). Three Justices would have made the extension to
public figures. Id. at 163, 172 (Chief Justice Warren concurring in result in both cases;
Justices Brennan and White concurring in Walker, dissenting in Butts). Two Justices
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Refusal to extend the doctrine does appear to be sound. The person
who is branded as disloyal will usually have said or done something to bring
public attention to himself, which increases the possibility of being defamed.
The effect of applying New York Times is that a person might avoid public
discussions because he would be without a remedy if he were libeled."' 0
This result is anomalous because the purpose of New York Times is to
assure that debate on public issues would be open and uninhibited by the
threat of lawsuit." 7 In the case of the public official, the public interest out-
weighs his private interest in his reputation,0 " for at least he is warned
that when he enters office he assumes the risk of defamation. The same
reasoning does not apply to the public figure, who has not decided to assume
the risks of holding public office. It is reasonable to say that voluntary
participation in public discussion should not divest one of his ability to
protect himself by a libel action.
CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that a false statement of disloyalty will continue to
be an actionable defamation because of its certain ability to injure the
plaintiff's reputation in the community. Any community will naturally
react unfavorably to beliefs, causes, or actions that threaten its institu-
tions. 9 The only real question is the form the epithet takes and whether
that form is capable of imputing disloyalty. Mere dissent from existing
governmental policies is not sufficient, nor is advocating a different theory
of government, as long as it is not based upon sabotage or violence? 10
Though Communist-related epithets have been successful bases for suits, it
is possible that uncertainty about the meaning of the term, and the public
awareness of a need for open discussion, might limit the libel per se doctrine
to direct statements that one is a Communist or favors Communism above
the government of the United States."' New York Times v. Sullivan has
felt that even New York Times was too great a restriction on the free speech guarantee
of the First Amendment. Id. at 171 (Justices Black and Douglas, concurring in Walker,
dissenting in Butts).
106. Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 978-79, 269 N.Y.S.2d 11,
15-16 (Sup. Ct. 1966); Bertelsman, supra note 97, at 660.
107. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
108. Id.; Pauling v. National Review, Inc., 49 Misc. 2d 975, 978-80, 269 N.Y.S.2d
11, 15-16 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
109. See Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 797 (1946); Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co., 139 11. 345, 28 N.E. 692
(1891).
110. See notes 68-75 supra and accompanying text.
111. See Clark v. Allen, 415 Pa. 484, 204 A.2d 42 (1964); Mosler v. Whelan, 28
N.J. 397, 147 A.2d 7 (1958).
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placed emphasis on the need for free discussion. It would be logical for
this emphasis to go beyond the particular doctrine announced in that case
and enter the libel per se area. The result would be that courts would not
find a publication libelous per se unless it clearly meant that the plaintiff
was disloyal. However, this proposition can only be tested by more decisions
involving Communist imputations.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1968/iss1/8
